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Abstract 
In this study, we discuss an information asymmetry problem between a healthcare provider and 
consumers, and examine the strategy for a platform owner to mitigate this problem. Because the Internet 
has become a major media for healthcare information sharing, we believe that social networking sites 
may mitigate the problem of information asymmetry by providing a more efficient way to facilitate 
information sharing and quality disclosure. We develop a game-theoretic model describing the process 
of information exchange among healthcare consumers themselves and the platform on a social 
networking site. We show that this “strategy” of engaging in social networking sites is indeed helpful 
for revealing the quality information of a healthcare provider, and the existence of a healthcare social 
networking site does benefit patients. Finally, we discuss factors affecting the platform owner’s decision. 
Keywords: Information asymmetry, quality disclosure, healthcare, social networking sites, network 
externality 
 
 
  
1 INTRODUCTION 
The healthcare industry, which consists of a wide range of sectors including pharmacies, hospitals, 
nursing, medical device manufacturing, etc., plays a growing important role in the world’s economy 
(Mahmud and Parkhurst, 2007). Two major participants in the industry are healthcare providers and 
consumers. The former involves all kinds of medical specialists providing professional knowledge and 
suggestions, such as physicians, psychiatrists, dentists, nurses, babysitters, etc. The latter receives 
healthcare services and therefore cares about the quality of providers. To facilitate our discussions, in 
this study we will call all those who deliver medical services as healthcare providers, and all those who 
receive services as patients. 
Information asymmetry between patients and healthcare providers has called researchers’ and 
practitioners’ attention. As Angst et al. (2014) point out, the extent of information disclosed are leading 
indicators for patients to choose a healthcare provider. On the one hand, patients prefer to obtain more 
information about their health conditions as well as the quality and reputation of a healthcare provider 
(Vick and Scott, 1998; Angst et al., 2014). On the other hand, high-quality healthcare providers may 
wish to creditably convey their quality information to the patients, so as to differentiate themselves from 
the low quality ones. This widely observed problem has given rise to initiatives and policies encouraging 
healthcare providers to voluntarily disclose their quality information (Angst et al., 2014). It is thus 
critical for a healthcare provider to reveal its quality to patients.  
One popular channel to share healthcare information is healthcare social media. In the past few years, 
social media has no doubt influenced nearly all aspects of our lives. From casual conversation to 
professional knowledge, countless messages and information were exchanged upon it every second, 
every day. Among all kinds of social media, social networking sites focusing on healthcare information 
sharing particularly play a significant role. Eysenbach and Kohler (2003) indicate that around 4.5% of 
all search terms are considered health-related. 85% of Americans had access to the Internet, 48% looked 
at social networking sites at least once per day, and 34% of them read about other people’s health 
experiences (Greaves et al., 2013). The need for healthcare information gives rise to more and more 
healthcare social networking sites. The most well-known site PatientsLikeMe was founded in 2004 with 
the goal of providing a platform for patients with similar disease to communicate. It now has more than 
400,000 members discussing more than 2,500 conditions.1  This shows that healthcare information 
sharing online has indeed become a prevalent phenomenon. 
The emergence of these healthcare social networking sites leads us to some basic questions: Why 
healthcare information sharing is so prevalent? What information is being shared on these sites? 
According to Eysenbach (2003), patients often feel that the information provided by health professionals 
is not adequate, and most of them would like to have as much information as possible. He also 
emphasizes that information acquisition and social support are the two major motives for a cancer 
patients to join a healthcare social networking site. In a research about online communities for patients 
with diabetes, around 66% of the posts were patients’ personal experiences regarding diabetes 
management, and 24% seek for interpersonal support (Greene et al., 2011). Obviously, most patients are 
not satisfied with the information provided by the healthcare providers, and therefore turn to social 
networking sites to seek for more help. 
Because the Internet has become a major media for healthcare information sharing, we believe that 
social networking sites may mitigate the problem of information asymmetry by providing a more 
efficient way to facilitate information sharing and quality disclosure. In fact, one may do more than just 
building a social networking site. For instance, a social media owner may voluntarily join the discussions 
initiated by patients on online communities, or provide professional suggestions to attract more users 
and foster its network size. Once the network size becomes large enough, more patients would join the 
network and exchange information about the quality of healthcare providers on the site and further 
                                              
1 Information source: https://www.patientslikeme.com/. 
  
mitigate information asymmetry problem. Is this “strategy” of engaging in social networking sites really 
helpful for revealing the true quality of a healthcare provider? If so, is it true for high-quality providers, 
low-quality providers, or both? Does the existence of a healthcare social networking site benefit patients? 
What factors affect the amount of benefits, if any, brought to patients?  
In this study, we discuss an information asymmetry problem among a healthcare provider, a social 
networking platform, and patients. The quality of the service provided by the healthcare provider can be 
observed by neither patients nor the platform owner. Our main objective is to examine the strategy for 
the platform owner to mitigate this problem through engaging in information sharing. We develop a 
game-theoretic model describing the process of information exchange among patients themselves and 
the platform owner on a social networking site. The platform owner will decide to what extend to 
participate in information sharing on the site. This affects the network size of the social networking site. 
Patients who has experienced the service from the healthcare provider will then pass positive or negative 
recommendations to unexperienced patients, who then update their beliefs on the healthcare provider’s 
quality. Finally, based on the updated beliefs, unexperienced patients will decide whether to purchase 
the healthcare service. We characterize the platform owner’s optimal degree of engagement and study 
the implications of it.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review some related works. In 
Section 3, an economic model is formulated to describe information exchange between a platform owner 
and patients on a social networking site. We then provide our findings in Section 4. Section 5 discusses 
extensions of our basic model. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.  
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The problem of information asymmetry exists nearly everywhere involving the principal-agent 
relationship. Akerlof (1970) studies quality uncertainty in the used-car market and observes that when 
the sellers (principals) has more information than buyers (agents), high-quality sellers would turn out 
finding it profitless to stay in the market, which would then be filled with low-quality cars (lemons). 
Spence (1973) studies quality uncertainty in job market where the employers cannot observe the hidden 
productivity of employees. This leads to low wages which drive productive people out of the job market 
and make employers unable to find high-quality workers. The same problem exists in the healthcare 
industry. Vick and Scott (1998) demonstrate the importance of information exchange between 
healthcare providers who possess hidden medical information and patients. Su and Zenios (2006) 
discuss information asymmetry problem in kidney allocation. They point out that in addition to the 
features of a kidney, transplant candidates also have hidden information about their health conditions. 
One similar issue is studied by Howard (2002), who shows that a candidate may turn down an organ, 
despite of the shortage, depending on his or her current health level. Our main focus in this study is on 
the healthcare providers’ hidden quality information, which is more relative with the work of Vick and 
Scott (1998).  
According to Eysenbach and Kohler (2003), a patient’s information need is a critical motive for 
searching health information online or attending social networking sites. In earlier literature, the strong 
relationship between social support and health condition of a patient has been discussed. Vogt et al. 
(1992) find that a patient’s social support network has negative correlation with the mortality rate among 
people with ischemic heart disease, cancer, and stroke. Eysenbach and Kohler (2003) mention that by 
obtaining health information on the virtual communities, patients may feel empowered and become 
more confident.  
Several past works are related to healthcare social media. Greene et al. (2011) highlight the need for 
information and the role of healthcare social networking sites. However, they also note that promotional 
posts could erode patients’ trust on the credibility of information. Wicks et al. (2012) state that after 
joining the social networking site PatientsLikeMe, people with epilepsy are connected with each other, 
and hence help extend their understanding and management about their health conditions. Evaluating 
healthcare providers is no doubt one of the main reasons for patients to exchange information online. 
  
According to Chaniotakis and Lymperopoulos (2009), a patient’s satisfaction toward the service 
provided by maternities is positively associated with the word of mouth effect. In the retailing industry, 
Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) show that word of mouth indeed affects a consumer’s online purchase 
decision on Amazon and Barnes & Noble. For these reasons, we wonder if healthcare providers may 
also build up credibility through online word of mouth. 
Since the seminal works by Akerlof (1970) and Spence (1973), people start to discuss how a principal 
may use signalling strategies to creditably convey quality information to agents. Desai and Srinivasan 
(1995) study demand signalling through two-part tariffs. Other mechanisms include advertising (Nelson, 
1974; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Kihlstrom and Riordan, 1984), warranties (Balachander, 2001; 
Soberman, 2003; Jiang and Zhang, 2011), returns (Moorthy and Srinivasan, 1995), selling through 
reputable retailers (Chu and Chu, 1994), and online word of mouth (Mayzlin, 2006). Kalra and Li (2008) 
show that a firm can signal its quality to consumers through specialization. Angst et al. (2014) mention 
that hospitals with low quality or bad financial conditions are less likely to disclose their quality 
information. Though in this study no player really does signalling, our work may still contribute to this 
stream of literature by discussing the importance of quality disclosure and potential of signalling in the 
healthcare domain.  
3 MODEL 
We consider a group of patients (for each of them, he) and a platform owner (she) who maintains a 
social networking site (SNS) on which patients exchange healthcare-related information. Different 
patients may have different degrees of technology adoption. We model their extent of repellence by 
assuming a cost 𝜂  of joining the SNS for each patient. We assume that 𝜂  is uniformly distributed 
between 0 and 1, where a patient with a low value of 𝜂 enjoys online networking more than one with a 
high value of 𝜂. Due to network externality, more patients joining the site will bring more benefits to 
everyone on it. Collectively, if the platform owner does nothing but building the SNS, the utility function 
for a patient with 𝜂 to join the site is 
 𝒫(𝜂) = 𝑣 − 𝜂 + 𝑡𝜂∗, (1) 
where 𝑣 > 0 is the stand-alone benefit of joining the SNS, 𝑡 > 0 is the degree of network externality, 
and 𝜂∗ is the equilibrium number of patients on the SNS. It is clear that a patient will join the SNS if 
and only if  𝜂 < 𝜂∗  (cf. Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Patients’ extent of repellence affecting joining decision. 
Besides patients and the platform owner, there is also an exogenous healthcare provider who provides 
healthcare service with private quality information. Customers are heterogeneous on their willingness 
to pay for the quality of healthcare service. Let 𝜃 be the customer’s willingness-to-pay, a patient will 
purchase the service from the healthcare provider if  
 𝜃𝑞 − 𝑝 ≥ 0, (2) 
where q is his belief on the service quality and 𝑝 is the price charged for the service. We assume that 𝜃 
is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Moreover, we assume that 𝑞 ∈ {𝑞𝐿, 𝑞𝐻}  is the service 
provider’s private information. We assume that 𝑞𝐿 < 𝑞𝐻, so 𝑞 = 𝑞𝐿 means that the provider’s service is 
of low quality, and 𝑞 = 𝑞𝐻 otherwise.  
Depending on whether one has experienced the service provided by the healthcare provider, patients are 
divided into two groups: experienced patients and naïve patients. We use 𝛼 ∈ (0, 1) and 1 − 𝛼  to 
denote the proportion of experienced and naïve patients, respectively. It is assumed that whether one is 
  
experienced and 𝜂 are independent. If a patient has neither experienced the service from the provider 
nor heard anything from other patients, his prior belief on the service quality is 𝑞𝑝𝑟𝑖 =  𝛾𝑞𝐻 + (1 −
𝛾)𝑞𝐿, where 𝛾 ∈ (0,1) is his prior belief for the quality to be high. An experienced customer, who will 
not purchase the service again, knows the true quality. For the segment of patients who do not join the 
SNS, because they cannot count on any messages about the provider, they make purchasing decision 
solely based on expected quality 𝑞𝑝𝑟𝑖. Therefore, a naïve patient not on the SNS would buy the service 
if 𝜃𝑞𝑝𝑟𝑖 − 𝑝 ≥ 0.  
For the segment of patients joining the SNS, patients exchange information with each other. Therefore, 
a naïve patient may obtain some messages from other SNS users and then update his belief on 𝑞. We 
model this updating process by assuming that the patient will obtain one message about the service 
quality, which may be either positive or negative. If the message comes from an experienced patient, 
the probability that the message is positive and negative is ℎ(𝑞) and 1 − ℎ(𝑞), respectively, where 𝑞 is 
the true quality observed by the experienced patient and ℎ(⋅) is an increasing function whose range is 
within 0 and 1. In other words, the better the service, the higher the probability for an experienced user 
to say something good about it.  
Unfortunately, on an SNS it is also possible that such a message actually comes from a naïve user, and 
it may be too hard for one to verify the truthfulness of the message. In this case, we use 𝑘 ∈ [0,
1
2
] to 
denote the stand-alone probability for a naïve user to send a positive or negative message. When 𝑘 = 0, 
a naïve user stays honest and does not say anything about the provider. When 𝑘 goes up, naïve users 
becomes less honest and may randomly promote or demote the provider with no reason.  When 𝑘 =
1
2
, 
a naïve user is never honest and will definitely say something with no proof. 𝑘 is thus called the noise 
factor in this study. Note that 𝑘 is not affected by 𝑞 because the message sender has not experienced the 
service. Collectively, the probabilities for a naïve patient to get a positive and negative message when 
the true quality is 𝑞𝑖 are  
 Pr(positive|𝑞𝑖) = 𝛼ℎ(𝑞𝑖) + (1 − 𝛼)𝑘 and Pr(negative|𝑞𝑖) = 𝛼(1 − ℎ(𝑞𝑖)) + (1 − 𝛼)𝑘, (3) 
respectively. The probability that one gets no message is Pr(no|𝑞𝑖) = (1 − 𝛼)(1 − 2𝑘) , i.e., the 
probability of meeting another naïve user who is honest. For ease of exposition, we will set ℎ(𝑞) = 𝑞 
throughout this study. Our main findings remain qualitatively true for any ℎ(⋅) that is increasing and 
concave in [0, 1].  
Once a naïve patient receives a positive message, he will apply the Bayes’ rule to form his posterior 
beliefs as  
 Pr(𝑞𝐻|positive) =
𝑟Pr(positive|𝑞𝐻)
𝑟Pr(positive|𝑞𝐻)+(1−𝑟)Pr(positive|𝑞𝐿)
= 1 − Pr(𝑞𝐿|positive).  (4) 
Pr(𝑞𝐻|negative) and Pr(𝑞𝐿|negative) can be expressed in a similar way. We then have the posterior 
belief on 𝑞 upon receiving a positive message as  
 𝑞𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡(positive) = Pr(𝑞𝐻|positive)𝑞𝐻 + Pr(𝑞𝐿|positive)𝑞𝐿 . (5) 
𝑞𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡(negative) is expressed similarly.  
A naïve patient on SNS receiving a positive recommendation message would buy the service if 
𝜃𝑞𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡(positive) − 𝑝 ≥ 0 . Similarly, he would buy the service if 𝜃𝑞𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡(negative) − 𝑝 ≥ 0  upon 
receiving a negative message. It is still possible that he receives a neutral message from another naïve 
patient. In this case, he will buy the service if 𝜃𝑞𝑝𝑟𝑖 − 𝑝 ≥ 0, just like one not on the SNS. Collectively, 
we have  
 𝐴𝑖 = Pr(positive|𝑞𝑖) Pr (𝜃 ≥
𝑝
𝑞𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡(positive)
) 
          + Pr(negative|𝑞𝑖) Pr (𝜃 ≥
𝑝
𝑞𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡(negative)
) + Pr (no|𝑞𝑖) Pr (𝜃 ≥
𝑝
𝑞𝑝𝑟𝑖
) 
(6) 
  
as the probability for a naïve patient joining the SNS to buy the service with quality 𝑞𝑖, and 
 𝐴𝑁 = Pr (𝜃 ≥
𝑝
𝑞𝑝𝑟𝑖
) (7) 
as the probability for a naive patient who does not join the SNS (or receive no message on the SNS) to 
buy the service. 
The platform owner will decide the amount of platform-generated contents 𝑚 ≥ 0, represented by, e.g., 
the number of articles posted on the SNS every week or the number of educational messages sent to 
patients for answering their questions. It costs the platform owner 
1
2
𝛽𝑚2 to achieve the participation 
level 𝑚. Once the platform owner is highly involved in the SNS, a patient will benefit from the positive 
network externality by interacting with the owner. In this case, his utility function becomes  
 𝒫(𝜂) = 𝑣 − 𝜂 + 𝑡(𝜂∗ + 𝑚). (8) 
Note that if the platform owner does not want to generate any contents on the SNS, she will set 𝑚 = 0, 
and then the patient's utility function will reduce to the one with no platform owner’s participation.  
Based on whether the platform owner is aware of the quality of the healthcare provider, we have two 
different scenarios. In the first scenario, the platform is not aware of the quality of the provider. We call 
such a platform a innocent platform. In the second one, the platform knows the quality. She is then called 
a knowledgeable platform in this case. No matter which scenario it is, the platform owner should choose 
the amounts of platform-generated contents 𝑚∗  to maximize the influence of the platform. More 
precisely, the platform owner acts to maximize the ability for the platform to attract naïve patients to 
buy the service when the provider’s quality is high and to discourage them not to buy it when the 
provider’s quality is low. 
Scenario 1: Innocent platform. For the innocent platform owner who does not know the quality of the 
provider, she calculates the expected value of the platform’s influence and solves the maximization 
problem 
 𝒮𝐼 = max
𝑚≥0
 (1 − 𝛼)𝜂∗{𝛾(𝐴𝐻 − 𝐴𝑁) + (1 − 𝛾)(𝐴𝑁 − 𝐴𝐿)} −
𝛽𝑚2
2
. (9) 
Scenario 2: Knowledgeable platform. For the knowledgeable platform owner who knows the quality 
of the provider, she solves two different maximization problems depending on the service quality: 
 𝒮𝐻
𝐾 = max
𝑚≥0
 (1 − 𝛼)𝜂∗(𝐴𝐻 − 𝐴𝑁) −
𝛽𝑚2
2
, (10) 
 𝒮𝐿
𝐾 = max
𝑚≥0
 (1 − 𝛼)𝜂∗(𝐴𝑁 −𝐴𝐿) −
𝛽𝑚2
2
. (11) 
Due to page limit, in this study we only include the analysis for the knowledgeable platform.2 
Note that while both patients and the platform owner may send messages, these messages are different 
by nature. We assume that patients will not believe in the owner’s messages about the provider’s quality, 
and thus the owner may only send educational messages that affects the size the user base of the SNS. 
Only patients may send recommendation messages to affect others’ beliefs on the hidden quality.  
The sequence of events of the game is as follows. First, the platform owner decides the amount of 
educational messages she wants to send on the SNS. Second, all patients decide whether to join the SNS 
simultaneously. Third, each naive patient on SNS receives a positive, a negative, or no recommendation 
message about the quality of the healthcare provider. Patients then update their beliefs on the provider’s 
quality according to the message received. Finally, all patents make their purchase decisions based on 
their beliefs simultaneously.  
                                              
2 Reader who are interested in the analysis for the innocent platform may contact the authors for a full-length manuscript.  
  
4 ANALYSIS 
To highlight the impact of quality difference and network externality on the platform owner’s 
participation decision, in this section we will first set γ =  1
2
 and 𝑘 =  0. This allows us to obtain clear-
cut analytical results to answer our main research questions. We then examine the impact of γ and 𝑘 in 
Section 5. 
Firstly, we solve the maximization problems by differentiating equation (10) and (11) with respect to 
𝑚𝑖. Immediately we can derive the first-order solutions as  
 
𝑚𝐻
∗ =
(1−𝛼)( 𝑡1−𝑡)(𝐴𝐻−𝐴𝑁)
𝛽
 and 𝑚𝐿
∗ =
(1−𝛼)( 𝑡1−𝑡)(𝐴𝑁−𝐴𝐿)
𝛽
, (12) 
whose feasibility may be easily verified by showing 𝐴𝐻 > 𝐴𝑁 > 𝐴𝐿 . 𝑚𝐻
∗  and 𝑚𝐻
∗  are then the optimal 
amounts of platform-generated contents when the provider’s service quality is high and low, respectively.  
Our first finding is about the magnitudes of 𝑚𝐻
∗  and 𝑚𝐻
∗ . In particular, in Proposition 1 we show that 
𝑚𝐿
∗ ≥ 𝑚𝐻
∗ . Figure 2 provides an illustration.  
Proposition 1. 𝑚𝐿
∗ > 𝑚𝐻
∗  when 𝛾 = 1
2
  and 𝑘 = 0.  
 
Figure 2. Impact of 𝑞𝑖 and 𝛼 on 𝑚𝑖
∗. 
No matter how 𝑞𝐻 and 𝑞𝐿 change, 𝑚𝐿
∗  always remains greater than 𝑚𝐻
∗ . We find this result interesting 
while reasonable. It shows that the platform owner would become more drastic in generating contents 
when the service quality of the healthcare provider is low. She would try hard to grow her user base in 
order to let more patients be aware of the low-quality service. However, if the service quality is high, 
she would then devote less effort. As long as the quality difference between the two types of providers 
gets smaller, the efforts she makes for each type become more similar.  
Besides quality, there are other factors which could affect the platform owner’s decision. Proposition 2 
summarizes how 𝛽 and 𝑡 affect the degrees of participation.  
Proposition 2. 𝑚𝐻
∗  and 𝑚𝐿
∗  decreases in 𝛽 and increases in 𝑡 when 𝛾 = 1
2
  and 𝑘 = 0. 
The cost of generating contents apparently has an impact: higher 𝛽 forces the owner to send fewer 
messages. The degree of network externality plays a part as well. When 𝑡 becomes larger, patients in 
the SNS gain more benefits with the same number of patients on it. Engaging in the SNS can be more 
efficient, and the same effect can be achieved with less effort, giving the owner more incentives to send 
messages. 
The impact of 𝛼, the proportion of patients who are experienced, is somewhat more interesting. For both 
𝑚𝐻
∗  and 𝑚𝐻
∗ , we find a nonmonotone relationship between each of them and 𝛼. Figure 2 also illustrates 
this phenomenon.  
Proposition 3. When 𝛾 = 1
2
  and 𝑘 = 0, 𝑚𝐻
∗  and 𝑚𝐿
∗  increase in 𝛼 first until 𝛼 = 0.5. Thereafter, they 
decrease in 𝛼. 
  
As 𝛼 gradually moves from 0 to 0.5, the owner’s amount of platform-generated contents increases. 
However, when 𝛼 reaches the point 0.5, the amount of contents starts to drop. The intuition is as follows. 
Note that the owner may only send educational messages which affects user base of the SNS rather than 
recommendation messages which affects patients’ beliefs on the hidden quality. If there are not enough 
experienced patients disseminate the true quality of the provider, no matter how large her user base is, 
naïve patients’ beliefs, that is, 𝑞𝑝𝑟𝑖, will always remain the same. On the contrary, if the proportion of 
experienced patients in the SNS is too large, the benefit of affecting naïve patients’ believes becomes 
too small. Obviously, the optimal participation level then decreases as 𝛼 becomes even larger.  
5 EXTENSIONS 
As the impact of the patients’ prior distribution 𝛾 and the noise factor 𝑘 have not yet been considered, 
the main focus we want to discuss in Section 5 is the impact of these two parameters.  
5.1 Impact of prior distribution 
What would happen if we relax the assumption of 𝛾 =
1
2
? An interesting finding is shown in Figure 3. 
When 𝛾 changes from 0.5 to 0.15, 𝑚𝐿
∗ ≥ 𝑚𝐻
∗  still hold, though the difference become smaller. However, 
as 𝛾 keeps decreasing to, say, 0.05, 𝑚𝐻
∗  become greater than 𝑚𝐿
∗ . A small 𝛾 means that patients have no 
confidence in the healthcare provider’s quality from the beginning. If the provider does have high quality, 
the platform would need to generate more contents so as to indirectly persuade patients that the service 
quality is high. On the contrary, if the provider indeed has low quality, it would be unnecessary for the 
platform to generate contents and grow user base, because patients are already pessimistic about the 
quality and probably would not purchase the service. We summarize this finding in Observation 1.  
Observation 1. 𝑚𝐿
∗ < 𝑚𝐻
∗  if 𝛾 is small. 𝑚𝐿
∗ > 𝑚𝐻
∗  if 𝛾 is not too small.  
 
Figure 3. 𝑚𝐿
∗ ≥ 𝑚𝐻
∗  holds if 𝛾 is not too small. 
Similar findings to Proposition 2 and 3 are summarized in Observation 2. The amount of platform-
generated contents is obviously affected by the cost and degree of network externality. Besides, it 
increases in 𝛼 until 𝛼 reaches 0.5. After that, it decreases in 𝛼. 
Observation 2. Proposition 2 and 3 hold for all 𝛾 ∈ [0, 1]. 
As one can see in Figure 4, when 𝛾 moves from 0 to 1, the platform owner’s amount of platform-
generated contents increases first, reaches its peak before 𝛾 achieves 0.5, and then gradually decreases. 
We presume this observation reasonable, because when 𝛾 is too low, an isolated naïve patient who 
cannot count on any messages to update his belief is extremely pessimistic about the quality of the 
provider. Similarly, when 𝛾 is too high, a naïve patient is extremely optimistic. These two extreme 
situations make it harder for the platform owner to affect patients’ prior belief, and thus less effort would 
be put into. Note that 𝑚𝐻
∗  reaches its peak before 𝑚𝐿
∗  does. If the quality of the provider is high, platform 
owner becomes more sensitive to 𝛾 and would try harder to correct patients’ low prior belief while 𝛾 is 
really small. However, when 𝛾 keeps growing to a certain extent, platform owner would put more effort 
  
when the quality of the provider is low. The implication is the same as what we have discussed 
previously regarding Proposition 1 and Observation 1. 
Observation 3.  𝑚𝐻
∗  and 𝑚𝐿
∗  increase in 𝛾 first until they reach their peaks before 𝛾 achieves 0.5 and 
then decrease in 𝛾. 
 
Figure 4. The impact of 𝛾 on 𝑚𝑖
∗: As 𝛾 moves from 0 to 1, the high quality provider’s degree of 
participation increases first, and then gradually decreases before 𝛾 reaches 0.5. 
5.2 Impact of noise factor 
Observation 4. Proposition 1 and 2 hold for all 𝑘 ∈ [0, 1
2
]. 𝑚𝐻
∗  and 𝑚𝐿
∗  decrease in 𝑘. 
After relaxing the assumption of 𝑘 = 0, we observe that Proposition 1 and 2 hold for all 𝑘 ∈ [0, 1
2
]. 
Furthermore, we find that when 𝑘 becomes larger, the platform owner’s incentive of generating contents 
reduces (cf. Figure 5). As mentioned previously, 𝑘 is the stand-alone probability for a naïve user to send 
a (dishonest) positive or negative message. In other words, 𝑘 is the noise factor which could reduce the 
objectivity of recommendation messages sent by experienced patients. In this case, no matter how large 
the user base is, true quality cannot be revealed effectively, thus the owner has less incentive to generate 
contents. 
 
Figure 5. The impact of 𝑘 on 𝑚𝑖
∗. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, our main concern is whether a healthcare social networking site could help reveal the true 
quality of healthcare provider and thus mitigate information asymmetry problems. Most importantly, 
we want to know if it is possible to differentiate a high quality provider from a low quality one, and at 
the same time benefits patients. The platform owner plays an important role in fostering her network 
size through generating healthcare-related contents. Our findings show that as long as patients’ prior 
belief is not too small, platform owner would try harder to generate contents when the service quality is 
low in order to let more patients be aware of the low quality healthcare provider. This result fits with 
our expectation that through participating the SNS, the problem of information asymmetry is eased up, 
  
and therefore benefits the high quality provider. Although the provider cannot promote herself, patients 
can still be well aware of the true quality, as long as the owner knows what the suitable amount of 
platform-generated contents should be sent.  
Beside the cost, there are other factors which could affect a platform owner’s content amount decision. 
Network externality no doubt plays an important role. If user base of a SNS is not large enough, no 
matter how superior a provider is, quality information cannot be effectively disseminated, and naïve 
patients cannot make their purchasing decision with thorough messages. Maintaining reputation is of 
great importance as well, because a high quality provider should attract experienced patients to the site 
and disseminate good quality for her. Maximum effect would be reached if fostering network size of the 
SNS and keeping reputation could be proceeded at the same time. 
Naïve patients’ prior belief and noise factor have impact on the owner’s decision too. For the former, it 
could be related to circumstance at present. For the latter, it is necessary in our model considering the 
massive information produced every second which is out of order and can hardly be traced back to the 
source. If a naive patient who has not bought the service from the provider sends recommendation 
messages on the SNS, the owner’s decision would definitely be affected. 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1. To prove that 𝑚𝐿
∗ ≥ 𝑚𝐻
∗ , we only need  𝐴𝑁 − 𝐴𝐿 ≥ 𝐴𝐻 − 𝐴𝑁 (2𝐴𝑁 − 𝐴𝐿 −
𝐴𝐻 ≥ 0) to be satisfied when 𝑟 =  
1
2
 and 𝑘 =  0.  
2𝐴𝑁 − 𝐴𝐿 − 𝐴𝐻 = 𝛼(𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿) (1 −
2𝑝
𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿
) + 𝛼(2 − 𝑞𝐻 − 𝑞𝐿) (1 −
2𝑝
𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿
)
+ 2(1 − 𝛼) (1 −
2𝑝
𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿
) − 𝛼(𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿) (1 −
𝑝(𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿)
𝑞𝐻
2 + 𝑞𝐿
2 ) − 𝛼(2 − 𝑞𝐻 − 𝑞𝐿)(1
−
𝑝(2 − 𝑞𝐻 − 𝑞𝐿)
𝑞𝐻(1 − 𝑞𝐻) + 𝑞𝐿(1 − 𝑞𝐿)
− 2(1 − 𝛼) (1 −
2𝑝
𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿
)
= −
𝛼(𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿)
𝑞𝐻
2 + 𝑞𝐿
2 +
𝛼(2 − 𝑞𝐻 − 𝑞𝐿)
𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿 − 𝑞𝐻
2 − 𝑞𝐿
2 ≥ 0. 
Simplify the above inequality, we have 
𝛼𝑞𝐻
2 − 2𝛼𝑞𝐻𝑞𝐿 + 𝛼𝑞𝐿
2 = 𝛼(𝑞𝐻 − 𝑞𝐿)
2 ≥ 0, 
which holds. 
Proof of Proposition 2. We have  
𝜕𝑚𝐻
∗
𝜕𝛽
= −
(1 − 𝛼)(𝑝 − 𝑐)( 𝑡1−𝑡)(𝐴𝐻 − 𝐴𝑁)
𝛽2
< 0. 
𝜕𝑚𝐻
∗
𝜕𝑡
=
(1 − 𝛼)(𝑝 − 𝑐)(𝐴𝐻 − 𝐴𝑁)
𝛽
(
1
(1 − 𝑡)2
) > 0. 
Impact of 𝛽 and 𝑡 on 𝑚𝐿
∗  can be proved in a similar way. 
Proof of Proposition 3. To begin with, differentiate 𝑚𝐻
∗  with respect to 𝛼: 
𝜕𝑚𝐻
∗
𝜕𝛼
=
𝑡
(1 − 𝑡)𝛽
{(1 − 2𝛼)𝑞𝐻 (1 −
𝑝(𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿)
𝑞𝐻
2 + 𝑞𝐿
2 )
+ (1 − 2𝛼)(1 − 𝑞𝐻) (1 −
𝑝(2 − 𝑞𝐻 − 𝑞𝐿)
𝑞𝐻(1 − 𝑞𝐻) + 𝑞𝐿(1 − 𝑞𝐿)
) + (−2 + 2𝛼) (1 −
2𝑝
𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿
)
+ 1 −
2𝑝
𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿
}. 
  
Then, substitute 𝛼 = 0.5 into the above expression, and find that the slope at point 0.5 is zero. Now we 
only need to know if the coefficient sign for the quadratic term 𝛼2 is negative to make sure that it is a 
concave function. After some arithmetic, the coefficient for 𝛼2 is 
−
𝑝𝑞𝐿(𝑞𝐿 − 𝑞𝐻)
3
𝑞𝐿
5 + (𝑞𝐻 − 1)𝑞𝐿
4 + (2𝑞𝐻
2 − 2𝑞𝐻)𝑞𝐿
3 + (2𝑞𝐻
3 − 2𝑞𝐻
2 )𝑞𝐿
2 + (𝑞𝐻
4 − 2𝑞𝐻
3 )𝑞𝐿 + 𝑞𝐻
5 − 𝑞𝐻
4 . 
The numerator is negative, thus the denominator has to be negative as well. Let the denominator be 
denoted by ℎ(𝑞𝐿): 
ℎ(𝑞𝐿) = 𝑞𝐿
5 + (𝑞𝐻 − 1)𝑞𝐿
4 + 2𝑞𝐻(𝑞𝐻 − 1)𝑞𝐿
3 + 2𝑞𝐻
2 (𝑞𝐻 − 1)𝑞𝐿
2 + 𝑞𝐻
3 (𝑞𝐻 − 2)𝑞𝐿 + 𝑞𝐻
4 (𝑞𝐻 − 1). 
According to Descartes' rule of signs, ℎ(𝑞𝐿) has one sign change between the first and second terms. 
Therefore, it has exactly one positive root. Besides, ℎ(0) = 𝑞𝐻
4 (𝑞𝐻 − 1) ≤ 0, which indicates that ℎ(1) 
must be less than or equal to zero so as to satisfy Descartes’ rule of signs while make sure that when 
𝑞𝐿 ∈ [0, 1], ℎ(𝑞𝐿) would be less than or equal to 0. To confirm that, we apply S.O.C , differentiate ℎ(1) 
with respect to 𝑞𝐻 twice, and have ℎ
′′(1) = 20𝑞𝐻
3 > 0, which implies that ℎ(1) is a concave function. 
Let 𝑡(𝑞𝐻) = ℎ(1). Because 𝑡(0) = 0  and 𝑡(1) = 0 , in addition to the fact that ℎ(1)  is a concave 
function, we are now certain that ℎ(1) is less than or equal to zero for 𝑞𝐻 ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, ℎ(𝑞𝐿) is 
less than or equal to zero, indicating that the coefficient for 𝛼2 is negative and 𝜕𝑚𝐻
∗ 𝜕𝛼⁄  is a concave 
function. Impact of 𝛼 on 𝑚𝐿
∗  can be proved in a similar way. 
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